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Cyborg Heart: 
The A! ective Apparatus of Bodily Production 
of ICD Patients 
Pernille Bjørn and Randi Markussen 
We argue that a cyborg approach both emphasizes the complexity in treating patients 
with implantable cardioverter de" brillators (ICDs) attached to home monitoring 
devices, and makes it possible to decipher modern perspectives in the notion of 
‘Patient 2.0’ and other representations of patients. We attempt to open up the 
notion of Patient 2.0 exempli" ed by ICD patients by drawing on the cyborg idea as 
developed by Donna Haraway as well as her understanding of science and the body 
as an apparatus of bodily production. We include the feminists Rosi Braidotti, Anne 
Balsamo, Geo!  Bowker, and Leigh Star in discussing the cyborg, its infrastructures and 
a! ective potentials. We analyse modern imaginaries of remote monitoring as they are 
portrayed on the websites of the two largest manufacturers of ICD technologies, and 
based on an analysis of the apparatus of bodily production involved when patients 
visit a hospital to have their illness monitored we propose the analytical device cyborg 
heart to capture an a! ective apparatus of bodily production in the clinic and the idea 
of an enlarged sense of community as opposed to modern imaginaries of patient 
empowerment. Finally we discuss how the device cyborg heart di! ers from the notion 
logic of care.
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Life is beyond pleasure and pain – it is 
a process of becoming, of stretching the 
boundaries of endurance. ! ere is noth-
ing self-evident or automatic about life. 
It is not a habit, though it can become 
an addiction. One has to ‘jump-start’ 
into life each and every day; the electro-
magnetic charge needs to be renewed 
constantly. ! ere is nothing natural or 
given about it. (Braidotti, 2006: 211)
Introduction 
In 1982 Ridley Scott released his " lm Blade 
Runner, based on Philip K. Dick’s book Do 
Androids Dream of Electric Sheep? (Dick, 
1968). ! e " lm’s futuristic image suggests 
that androids are stronger and more capable 
than humans. Androids could only be told 
apart from humans by the use of advanced 
equipment to detect feelings and emotions 
through their eyes, and the most advanced 
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androids were not even aware that they 
were not human, since they were given false 
memories of non-existent childhoods. ! e 
portrayal of androids in Blade Runner calls 
into question what it means to be human 
or machine. ! e ambiguity of several 
characters urges us to ask, what does it mean 
to live in a time dominated by scienti" c and 
technological imaginaries (Balsamo, 1997)? 
Although the characters in Blade Runner are 
science " ction, the question remains highly 
relevant in order to appreciate what ‘Patient 
2.0’ is about?
‘Patient 2.0’ is a modern term. ‘Patient’ 
literally means su# ering, and refers to 
people who are a# ected by the action of 
others, i.e. medical institutions, doctors 
etc. ! e digits ‘2.0’ refer to a new version 
of a web-based information infrastructure. 
Following the modern idea of progress 
the implied suggestion seems to be that 
‘2.0’ possesses the potential to empower/
emancipate patients by o# ering them more 
opportunities of participating in their own 
treatment. Emancipation literally means, ‘to 
come out from under the hand of’ (Lerner, 
1986: 237). ! us ‘2.0’ denotes not only new, 
but better than ‘1.0’ in the sense that the 
patient potentially becomes less dependent 
on other people and gain more freedom. 
! e idea is not that the patient becomes 
‘more patient’ as the numbers go up, or 
‘more entangled’ in the infrastructure as the 
science " ction imaginary suggests. It reads 
as a modern human centred term rather 
than a post human term.
We investigate controversies 
regarding human versus post-human 
perspectives through a cyborg lens and 
focus on patients with an implantable 
cardioverter de" brillator (ICD) hooked 
up to a remote monitoring system. ! ese 
patients are literally cyborgs as beings 
relying on a cybernetic ‘command, 
control and communication’ mechanism 
the phenomenon that Haraway took as 
starting point in her cyborg con" guration. 
(Haraway, 1991: 150). ! e ICD device is a 
small, battery-powered electrical impulse 
generator programmed to detect cardiac 
arrhythmia and correct it by delivering a 
chock of electricity. It is implanted under 
the skin. ! e device appeared in the US in 
1980 and in Denmark in 1989. More and 
more people are under treatment, both 
those surviving severe heart problems and 
heart attacks. Increasingly ICD are also 
used prophylactic (Køber et al., 2006). ICD 
patients appear as any human in the society, 
as it is invisible for others how they embody 
complex contemporary human-machine 
relations. One needs ‘blade runners’ so to 
speak, doctors with advanced equipment to 
tell the di# erence. 
Haraway’s cyborg " guration (1991: 
149) builds on a blurring of key modern 
distinctions, such as human versus machine, 
organic versus inorganic, and natural 
versus arti" cial, which contemporary 
scienti" c approaches in biology as 
well as communication sciences have 
brought about (Haraway, 1991: 149). ! e 
approach di# ers from sciences operating 
on essential categories of the human, the 
organism, the machine etc. and challenges 
distinctions between what belongs to 
nature and what belongs to culture. ! ose 
distinctions ‘implode’ when sciences work 
by ‘translating the world into a problem of 
coding and information processing,’ relying 
on command, control, and communication 
mechanisms that connect humans and 
machines. Mind, body, and technologies 
are ‘on very intimate terms’ (Haraway, 1991: 
165). 
Looking into the ICD device 
infrastructures, we are curious to learn 
how sciences and stakeholders imagine 
and manage ICD patients and what kind of 
realities they help bring about. ! e cyborg 
approach invites us to include popular 
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images of ICD patients, as well as the 
practices implicated in their treatment. 
In what follows, we explore how ICD 
patients are imagined in the public space of 
the Internet from the perspectives of two of 
the largest ICD technology manufacturers. 
In addition, we move to a heart clinic 
at a university hospital to decipher the 
knowledge production in the treatment 
of the patients, the infrastructures and 
the involvement of the patients in the 
collaboration. Subsequently, we bring the 
various theoretical as well as empirical 
images together to discuss di# erences 
between modern and cyborg approaches 
in understanding patients and their ethical 
implications. 
We embark on this journey, by going 
" fty years back in history and look at the 
genealogy of the term cyborg in order 
to emphasize Haraway’s vision and its 
implication for making sense of ICD patients 
and open up the notion ‘Patient 2.0’.
Cyborgs for Earthly Survival 
When Donna Haraway coined the term 
cyborg in the early 1980s, she was unaware 
of its former use in another " eld (Markussen 
et al., 2000: 10). ! e term " rst appeared in 
1960 in connection to experiments in the 
" eld of medical cybernetics (Kline, 2009: 
333). Engaged in bioastronautics, Manfred 
Clynes and Nathan Kline introduced the 
term as an abbreviation for ‘cybernetic 
organism’ (Clynes & Kline, 1960). ! ey 
built on Norbert Wiener’s de" nition of 
cybernetics as the entire " eld of control 
and communication theory, whether in the 
machine or the animal. ! e term was meant 
to indicate a literal fusion of human/animal 
and machine, as in the laboratory mouse 
they experimented with by implanting an 
osmotic pump. ! e researchers used the 
pump to inject drugs at a rate controlled 
by biological feedback and monitored the 
e# ects. 
! e goal was to develop drugs and 
devices that would make it possible for 
a human to adapt to an extraterrestrial 
environment through what they called a 
‘participant evolution’. ! ey imagined that 
scientists had a great role to play in making 
evolution progress much quicker than a 
‘natural evolution’ was able to bring about. 
Paradoxically, the idea was to free astronauts 
from a cumbersome arti" cial environment 
that imitated worldly conditions in order for 
them to survive in outer space. According 
to the historian Ronald Kline (2009), even 
though those cyborg ideas involved serious 
interventions into the human body, such 
as arti" cial organs, hypothermia, drugs, 
sensory deprivation, and cardiovascular 
models, Clynes and Kline thought of the 
changes as strictly related to extraterrestrial 
survival conditions, without impinging on 
the human in his or her earthly habitat: 
‘Cyborgs would be humans with some 
organs only temporarily altered or replaced 
by mechanical devices. On returning to 
earth, the devices would be removed and 
normal body functions restored’ (Kline, 
2009: 342).
Haraway’s cyborg vision in ‘Cyborg 
Manifesto’ (Haraway, 1990) di# ers radically 
from those ideas, both in terms of the 
perception of the body and of the authority 
of science. Despite their ambitions about 
fusions of human and machine, Clynes 
and Kline’s cyborg imagery implies that 
an ‘organic’ body can be extraordinarily 
manipulated without losing its 
characteristics or being marked. Haraway’s 
vision is cleared of the innocence as well as 
the anthropocentrism that characterizes the 
early cyborg imagery. A distinction between 
a natural and a participant evolution is 
irrelevant when it no longer makes sense 
to speak of nature in the singular and as a 
base on which cultures build. In addition, 
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her vision of science is very di# erent from 
the heroic and anthropocentric idea of a 
science and scientists who transcend earthly 
conditions. Haraway’s slogan ‘Cyborgs 
for earthly survival’ does away with the 
dualist distinction between extraterrestrial 
and terrestrial survival and the idea of a 
heroic masculine science that overcomes 
the shortcomings of the body in space. 
Her catchphrase stresses immanence: 
Cyborgs are we, earthly creatures in a 
world increasingly marked by cybernetic 
communication technologies and scienti" c 
imageries. ICD patients stand out as an 
apparent example. ! e cyborg " guration 
emphasizes that they are indeed unique, 
yet at the same time, we as contemporary 
subjects are connected in an enlarged sense 
of a sociomaterial community. 
! e cyborg invites us to take a closer 
look at how a body comes into being and 
to question entrenched ideas about an 
organic body as opposed to an arti" cial one. 
Alluding to Simone de Beauvoir’s famous 
statement, ‘one is not born a woman’ 
(Beauvoir, 1952), Haraway argues that the 
same is true for organisms. She o# ers the 
term ‘the apparatus of bodily production’ to 
capture the generation of bodies and other 
scienti" c objects in scienti" c knowledge 
production (Haraway, 1984: 200). Nature 
does not work as ‘raw material’ for science, 
and the body is not a blank page for social 
and scienti" c inscriptions, a passive object 
of knowledge, not unlike the imagery we 
saw in the early cyborg discourse. Haraway 
states:
‘I wish to translate the ideologi-
cal dimensions of ‘facticity’ and ‘the 
organic’ into a cumbersome entity 
called a ‘material-semiotic actor.’ ! is 
unwieldy term is intended to highlight 
the object of knowledge as an active, 
meaning-generating axis of the appa-
ratus of bodily production, without ever 
implying immediate presence of such 
objects or, what is the same thing, their 
" nal or unique determination of what 
can count as objective knowledge at a 
particular historical juncture. (…) Bod-
ies as objects of knowledge are material-
semiotic nodes. ! eir boundaries mate-
rialize in social interaction. Bounda-
ries are drawn by mapping practices; 
‘objects’ do no pre-exist as such. Objects 
are boundary projects. But boundaries 
shift from within; boundaries are very 
tricky. What boundaries provisionally 
contain remains generative, produc-
tive of meanings and bodies’ (Haraway, 
1991: 201f).
Scienti" c representations do not mirror 
nor control a passive reality, but act as 
interventions in a dynamic reality in 
Haraway’s pragmatic material and relational 
approach. Whether cyborg indicates 
analogies or literal human-machine fusions 
is not important in her pragmatic and 
nonrepresentational context. ‘! e cyborg 
is text, machine, body, and metaphor – 
all theorized and engaged in practice in 
terms of communication’ (Haraway, 1991: 
212). Haraway’s cyborg " guration has been 
widely explored in feminist, cultural and 
science studies of contemporary culture 
and sociotechnical practices. ! e feminist 
philosopher Rosi Braidotti describes the 
cyborg as a ‘connection-making entity, a 
" gure of interrelationality, receptivity and 
global communication’ (Braidotti, 2006b: 
200). ! e " guration invites us to rethink 
the unity of human beings by suggesting 
an enlarged sense of community as an 
ethical implication. Braidotti introduces 
a noncognitive idea of understanding 
(Braidotti 2008: 184# ) and emphasizes 
a# ectivity and endurance as opposed to 
rationality as a positive force that ful" ls 
a subject’s capacity for interaction and 
freedom, no matter the position (Braidotti, 
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2006a: 148). She argues that an ethics of 
sustainability that does not have the human 
at the centre encourages an enlarged sense 
of community. 
In her in$ uential study ‘Technologies 
of the Gendered Body. Reading Cyborg 
Women,’ another feminist scholar, Anne 
Balsamo, understands the cyborg as a 
hybrid with asymmetrical boundaries:
Every cyborg image constructs an 
implicit opposition between machine 
and human, at once repressing simi-
larities and highlighting distinctions. In 
this way it de" nes the meaning of both 
the term ‘human’ and the term ‘arti" -
cial.’ Signs of human-ness and, alterna-
tively, signs of machine-ness function 
not only as markers of the ‘essences’ 
of the dual natures of the hybrid, but 
also signs of the inviolable opposi-
tion between humans an machines. 
But because the cyborg embodies both 
‘natures’ simultaneously, the result-
ing hybrid is neither purely human nor 
purely machine. ! e distribution of its 
dual dispositions is never simply sym-
metrical, and the proximity of each to 
the other and the combination of dis-
similar parts produces a hybrid often 
unrecognizable as any familiar person-
age. (Balsamo, 1997)
Balsamo underlines the contradictory 
elements in the " guration as well as the 
inability to reduce a hybrid " gure to either 
of its components. In addition, Balsamo 
shows how the material body is a critical 
symbolic resource for cultural expression, 
at the same time as its symbolic form is 
constructed in interaction with material 
bodies. Furthermore, she argues that 
" ctional narratives and images serve as 
cognitive maps of cultural arrangements 
(Balsamo, 1997:159# ). In line with Haraway, 
she urges us to take " ctional and popular 
cultural representations of the body as 
seriously as scienti" c representations and, 
just as importantly, to study how scienti" c 
and medical practices impact our lives.
Infrastructural inversion is a way to 
explore the cyborg " guration (Bowker & 
Star, 2002: 34). Infrastructural inversion 
emphasizes the non-neutral e# ects of 
technologies, especially technological 
infrastructures. Infrastructural inversion 
‘means recognizing the depths of 
interdependence of technical networks 
and standards on the one hand and the real 
work of politics and knowledge production 
on the other’ (Bowker & Star, 2002: 34). An 
ICD patient may appear as an individual 
with an implant; the inversion points to the 
infrastructure that the person depends on, 
in this case an array of interdependent, non-
neutral technical networks and standards, 
as well as the politics and knowledge 
production, without which neither person 
nor device would survive. According to Star, 
the cyborg is, in a sense, the relationship 
between standardized technologies/
infrastructures and local experience; the 
cyborg is between, yet in relationship with, 
the categories (Star, 1991: 39). 
We want to focus on the tensions in the 
cyborg " guration between standardized 
medical-device technologies and how they 
are implicated in local events of patients and 
healthcare practitioners and experiences in 
manners where none of them can be reduced 
to the other. How we de" ne objects and draw 
their boundaries have consequences. How 
are we to understand the role of science 
when we take into account the complex 
infrastructures involved in surviving as ICD 
patients?  
Access to ‘ICD Patients’ 
We approach the case of ‘ICD patients’ by 
studying the manufacturers‘ visions and 
the hospital practices involved in home 
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monitoring of ICD patients. ! e market 
for ICD implantations with the capability 
for remote monitoring of the ICD patients’ 
conditions is dominated by two medical 
device manufacturers, who design, build, 
and maintain the medical devices and 
the technical infrastructures required: 
Medtronic and Biotronik. Medtronic is an 
American-founded company established 
in 1949, today a multinational company 
specializing in disease management 
technologies including ICDs. In 2002 
they created the Medtronic Carelink 
Network; today 250,000 patients at nearly 
24 clinics in 20 countries are connected to 
Carelink (Medtronic.com). Biotronik is a 
European-founded company established 
in 1963 specializing in pacemakers and 
ICD manufacturing. In 2000, Biotronik 
introduced their remote home monitoring 
system, which is used in 3500 clinics across 
more than 55 countries (www.biotronik.de).
To examine the manufacturers’ 
perspective on ICD implants, patients, 
and infrastructures, we searched the two 
websites for all information about the ICD 
remote monitoring devices directed at 
patients written in English. ! e two websites 
explain remote monitoring di# erently. ! e 
Biotronik website presents several short 
videos portraying the patient as well as the 
healthcare professionals in relation to the 
ICD device and the remote monitoring. 
! e Medtronic website portrays the patient 
in terms of patient stories presented as 
narratives as well as pictures. We made the 
videos and the stories the centre of analysis. 
Despite the di# erences across the websites, 
the patients are characterized in similar 
ways. 
Studying the hospital practices around 
monitoring of ICD we observed the work 
practices within a heart clinic at a Danish 
university hospital. Approximately half 
of the heart failure patient population 
in Denmark (3000 patients) have ICD 
implants and the number is increasing, 
with approximately 700 new patients 
each year (Anonymous, 2012). ! e clinic 
specializes in medical device implantations, 
which includes ICDs. ! e heart clinic 
employs mostly physicians and bioanalysts, 
who assist with implantation as well as 
monitoring of ICDs. ! e medical device 
representatives are also present in the 
clinic. ! ey are typically former heart clinic 
employees, who have been recruited by the 
manufacturing company. We focus on the 
practices involved when patients with ICDs 
come in for a check-up at the heart clinic. 
Following Haraway (1990), Braidotti 
(2006), Balsamo (1997), and Bowker and 
Star (2002), the ubiquity of science and 
technology in society, so well-illustrated 
by ICD patients subjected to remote 
monitoring, makes it relevant to examine 
images of science outside laboratories 
and, in the case of medicine, in hospitals 
and medical practices. Especially with the 
expansion of the Internet, companies have 
an opportunity to address many groups, 
in our case patients, their families and the 
public, as well as relevant professional 
groups.
The Manufacturer’s Imaginary: The 
Patient in the Middle of Nowhere 
Our " rst stop in order to explore a cyborg 
approach is the manufacturer’s imaginary 
and cognitive mapping of their relation 
to ICD patients, as represented in their 
website. Modern sciences, technosciences, 
rely heavily on research and development 
in private and global companies, and 
ICDs are no exception. Investigating 
the manufacturers’ perspectives on the 
patients, we " nd that Biotronik explains the 
idea behind the ICD technology inventions 
as ‘products that would work as close 
to nature as possible’ (ref: http://www.
biotronik.de/). ! e image of getting close to 
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nature presumably indicates that the device 
makes life less painful and complicated for 
patients. But even though ‘nature’ appears 
as a self-explanatory stable standard in their 
design approach, the nature they are getting 
close to is described in a speci" c scienti" c 
language. We learn how Biotronik Research 
& Development created a feature for the 
ICD called ‘closed loop stimulation’, which 
integrates ‘the pacemaker into the body’s 
natural regulatory system. ! is allowed it 
[the ICD] to react to the patient’s changing 
physical and related mental activity’ (ref: 
http://www.biotronik.de/). 
It is clear from these quotes that ‘nature’ 
" gures as a system and as an ideal, in some 
respects similar to the cybernetic ideas put 
forth by Clynes and Kline (1960). ! e idea 
of the body as ‘a natural regulatory system’ 
belongs to a speci" c scienti" c language. 
It is at the same time a description that 
allows for implementing the technology, as 
nature, the body, is described in a language 
the technology can understand. ! e ICD is 
based on the idea that it can be smoothly 
integrated into the bodily functions, not 
only physically but also mentally. 
Metaphors in sciences and in other " elds 
work by making two subjects interact, in 
this case the subject ‘nature’ and the subject 
‘regulatory system’ (Black 1979 (1954)). ! e 
meanings of the two subjects interact with 
one another and create similarities. ! e 
idea that ‘nature’ is a ‘regulatory system’ has 
apparently worked so well that our idea of 
‘nature’ and how it works is shaped by the 
idea of a regulatory system, just as the idea 
of a regulatory system is shaped by its use 
in describing nature. Why some metaphors 
in science work more e# ectively than others 
is an interesting question (Fox Keller, 1988). 
It turns out that cybernetic metaphors 
constituted a resource for a number of quite 
di# erent biological agendas from the 1950s 
(Fox Keller, 2002: 149). ! e rhetorical use 
of the idea of ‘getting close to nature’ in the 
ICD manufacturer’s communication bears 
witness to the success of mapping nature 
cognitively in this manner. 
Let us take a closer look at how Biotronik 
envisions ICD home monitoring.
Figure 1 contains pictures from a Biotronik 
movie portraying ICD patients and what 
home monitoring implies. ! e " rst picture 
presents a white, middle-aged, middle-class 
man " shing in a small boat, completely on 
his own amid beautiful, natural scenery – 
a calm lake surrounded by mountains and 
trees. He is immersed in the wild, enjoying 
what seems to be his leisure or perhaps 
retirement time; the natural scenery acts 
as a symbol of personal freedom, of being 
outside social or other constraints. Home 
seems to be where the heart is, so to speak. 
Similarly, the ‘universal’ nuclear family 
appears when, at one point in the movie, 
he comes ashore and is met by his wife and 
younger child, a boy. 
 Figure 1. Screenshots from the Biotronik patient movie on home monitoring, www.
biotronik.de, June 2011.
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! e ‘front stage’ in this imaginary 
presents the patient as an ordinary person, 
able to enjoy life, free to move without any 
ties nor cumbersome connections and 
wires. ! e following clips in the movie (see 
also Figure 1) reveal the backstage and part 
of the infrastructure involved in making 
the image possible. We see the two options 
ICD patients have for home monitoring 
devices: Bedside version and the mobile 
version, which resembles an old-fashioned 
cell phone. It is then revealed that the man 
in the boat is wearing the mobile monitor 
on his belt while " shing. We see how data 
is transmitted continually, indicated in the 
movie by ‘rings of transmission’. ! en we 
watch a male physician sitting in his o%  ce 
monitoring his computer screen, where the 
data from the patient apparently ends up. 
We also see how the physician takes the 
telephone and calls the patient, presumably 
to inform him about his condition. 
! ese pictures from the movie convey 
the impression that home monitoring 
is easy for the patient and that the 
patient is free to live his life as if he were 
independent and self-contained. Easiness 
is an important argument in innovation and 
design (Markussen, 1995: 158). It is usually 
the life of the ‘receiver’—the user, the 
customer, the client, or the patient—that is 
portrayed in those terms. In contrast to the 
patient, science and the manufacturers are 
depicted as service apparatuses, constantly 
available to monitor the patient’s data, and 
continually in control and ready to contact 
the patient if they detect something the 
patient needs to know. Implicitly, it also 
shows that the free and easy life comes 
with a price, which can be described in the 
shape of the monitoring device and the data 
sent to the physician. ! e patient’s body 
seems to work primarily as ‘raw material for 
humanization’ (Haraway, 1991: 198), and 
monitoring the heart is all about scienti" c 
and clinical data and data transmission—
numbers, graphs, etc. Also, the image of 
the patient’s involvement in the monitoring 
practice during remote monitoring is 
presented as ‘all without the slightest patient 
interaction’ (Biotronik.de). In this perfect 
world patient interaction is not viewed as 
desirable, but should be minimized. 
Now shifting to the other ICD 
manufacturing company, Medtronic, we 
" nd similar imaginaries. Medtronic presents 
their home monitoring devices as:
Convenience – ! e Monitor is easy to 
use. With the simple, one-touch moni-
tor, you transmit device information 
over a standard analogue phone line. 
If you have an implanted heart device 
with Conexus Automatic Monitoring, 
your information may be sent automati-
cally while you sleep. Peace of mind 
– People who use Monitoring report 
a sense of reassurance knowing their 
doctor has access to important infor-
mation about their heart health. If you 
feel symptoms, your clinic may ask you 
to send information so your doctor can 
review your condition. If your device 
has the Conexus feature, alert noti" ca-
tions may be sent directly to your clinic 
as de" ned by your doctor.’ (http://www.
medtronic.com/patients/heart-failure/
living-with-a-device/carelink/carelink-
network/index.htm, emphasis added)
In this description, the material-semiotic 
actors involved in the apparatus of 
bodily production belong to science and 
technology. ! e design of the device seems 
to be created with the aim of ‘leaving out the 
patient’ as much as possible. ! e patient’s 
freedom and peace of mind are described as 
e# ects of not knowing or being involved as a 
material-semiotic actor. ! e special feature, 
‘Conexus’, makes it possible for the device to 
send all the required information while the 
patient is sleeping, where sleeping seems to 
be equated with not feeling anything. ! e 
boundaries around the object are drawn in 
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a manner that leaves out the dependency in 
the relation between patient and physician. 
It shows that the infrastructure involved in 
making monitoring at a distance possible 
is portrayed primarily from the perspective 
of the physician, in the transmission of data 
ready for interpretation and sense-making. 
Peace of mind comes not only with the price 
of the connections and wires, but also in 
surrendering to the power of the physician, 
and freedom from feeling their own 
symptoms and body. Freedom may even 
translate into loneliness, had the nuclear 
family picture in the Biotronik movie not 
referred to a myth of eternal happiness. 
To summarize: the manufacturers’ 
perspectives delegate power and authority 
to themselves and the sciences involved, 
and downplay uncertainty, lack of control, 
endurance and sensations on behalf of both 
themselves and the patients. ! e cyborg 
lens allows us to point to the ideal which 
structures those subject images, the ideal of 
a free-standing, individual human subject, 
and implicitly, even paradoxically, of 
science and scienti" c progress as guarantors 
of this ideal. It may come as no surprise that 
the websites are made up of recognizable 
and well-known, not to say banal and trivial, 
stereotypes. It is remarkable, however, 
that the cognitive mapping of those new 
technologies are primarily understood in a 
manner that nurtures ideas of one nature, 
uncontested scienti" c authority as well as a 
middle class nuclear family. We will return 
to this after a visit to the university hospital 
in order to explore the scienti" c practices 
the patients are involved in in this context.
The Clinic: Inverting the 
Infrastructure and Discovering an 
Enlarged Sense of Community
! e public-funded heart clinic we visited 
implants ICD devices in the patients and 
conduct device follow-up visits as well as 
home monitoring. But, even as we enter 
a public hospital, we do not leave the 
workspace of private companies, since the 
device representatives are also working 
in the heart clinic assisting the healthcare 
professionals. ! e boundaries between the 
public and the private have been reworked 
and recon" gured (Haraway, 1991: 151). 
Medical device companies play a crucial 
part in the apparatus of bodily production 
of ICD patients. A representative from 
the manufacturer is involved in the 
implantation; at an observation in the 
heart clinic we learned that during the 
implantation this privately-paid person has 
the authority to make the patient’s heart 
stop under controlled circumstances to 
ensure that the device works. In practice, 
this means that when a patient is sedated 
for surgery, one of the people assisting the 
procedure is a vendor representative with 
the overall responsibility to make sure that 
the technical device works. ! e apparatus 
of bodily production of ICD patients thus 
includes the public /private infrastructure 
of healthcare professionals.
Besides providing the device itself and 
assisting with the surgical procedure of 
inserting the device, the medical device 
manufacturers also provide geographically 
distributed global monitoring of the heart. 
When an ICD is inserted into a body, the 
ICD data are sent through the technical 
infrastructure and stored on servers in 
Europe to communicate updates to the heart 
clinic. ! ere is a connection between the 
$ esh and muscles and the wires measuring 
and monitoring the heart inside the body of 
the patient. Muscle vibrations are re" gured 
as ICD data, a coding that makes particular 
mappings and measurements possible, 
and recon" gures the heart in speci" c ways. 
! ere is a wireless connection between the 
device in the body and the telemonitoring 
system, located as a mobile device on the 
patient or as an item at the bedside. ! is 
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telemonitoring system is then connected 
to the device manufacturer, as well as to the 
heart clinic using the telephone network. 
! us, the connection is established and 
maintained by the telecommunication 
companies, but is in fact handled by the 
patients and their families in relation to the 
device manufacturer. ! ese various entities 
act invisibly and regularly for this particular 
apparatus of bodily production to survive. 
Telecommunication, family, devices, 
monitoring technologies etc. are all part of 
the apparatus of bodily production of ICD 
patients.
In addition, the telemonitoring system 
acts as a strong material-semiotic actor. It 
automatically assesses the ICD data that the 
patients regularly send to the Heart Center. 
! e assessment can be tricky and is therefore 
further controlled by other important 
actors, the healthcare professionals. Even 
though device follow-up can be done 
by telemonitoring, co-located meetings 
(where the patient travels to the hospital) 
are still important. In some cases patients 
travel far (like in Greenland while being 
treated at Copenhagen University hospital 
in Denmark) to receive device follow-up. 
ICD patients are also connected to local 
hospitals, and this local hospital manages 
the main examinations and treatments. 
! erefore, device follow-up at the heart 
clinic focuses primarily on the device. 
However, investigating devices implanted 
in people includes concerns for the general 
condition of the patient; it is not merely 
informing the healthcare professionals 
about the device. Possible interventions 
based on the interpretation of ICD data 
concern not only re-programming the 
device, but also changing the medication, 
which requires cooperation with the local 
hospital.
If one looks for the typical ICD patient, a 
visit to a clinic will quickly convince you that 
it is impossible to characterize ICD patients 
through means other than ‘patients carrying 
an ICD’. ICD patients might be senior 
citizens, children as young as 3 years of age, 
elite athletes in their 20s, blue-collar workers 
in their 30s, clerks, CEOs, mothers, fathers, 
the un-employed, university students, etc.
In the following we will study an ICD 
patient’s (in this case an elderly woman) 
follow-up visit to the heart clinic, which 
takes place once every three or six months. 
Elsewhere we have given a more detailed 
description of the practice (Andersen et al., 
2010). In this context, we will focus on the 
cyborg heart as a scienti" c object and how 
the bioanalysts and cardiologists make sense 
of data, and work together with the patient. 
! e imaginary from the manufacturers’ 
websites conveyed the perspective that 
physicians immediately knew how to 
decipher and control their data and the 
objects they were working with. However, 
we found in the clinic that cyborg hearts 
are boundary projects, and boundaries are 
enacted in the practices where they come 
together (Haraway, 1991: 201# ). One needs 
to make sense of data by diagnosing the 
patient’s body directly or indirectly through 
instruments and technologies (Hogle, 2008: 
842). 
How to render a body visible and legible is 
the topic in Medical Talk and Medical Work 
(Atkinson, 1995). Atkinson quotes a study 
of the use of echocardiography that showed 
how doctors in the beginning tended to 
diagnose the unusual as abnormal, which 
resulted in a proliferation of minor heart 
diseases: 
In practice then echocardiography has 
not resolved the problem of uncertainty. 
It requires interpretation of a complex 
moving image according to sometimes 
uncertain professional criteria. ! e 
image is recognised as being operator 
dependent, rapid advance in the tech-
nology means constant changes in tech-
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niques and there is seldom evidence 
from autopsy or operation to substanti-
ate the diagnosis of disease in the well 
patient. (Atkinson, 1995: 64 quoting 
Daly 1989: 104)
 
When the bioanalysts and cardiologists 
in the clinic are browsing through the 
information they receive on their screens, 
they are faced with similar problems of 
uncertainty in investigating curves and 
graphs in order to examine the values of the 
data – are they stable or not?
An elderly woman is being examined. 
! e bioanalyst asks the patient: ‘Please 
let me know how you feel, and what 
kind of medication you take?’ (…) ! e 
patient holds the ‘stick’ (reader) near 
the heart. ‘When was this?’(…) ! ere are 
marks—February 9th, April 20th, and 
April 29th.’ ! e patient says that she had 
not felt anything. She cannot remem-
ber these dates. But at some point the 
patient remembers: ‘Uhh, by the way, 
I did wake up screaming with a night-
mare a few weeks ago, but I did not feel 
much.’ (…) ! e bioanalyst (…) explains: 
‘(…) ! ey were all during the night; 
maybe that’s why you did not notice. 
Maybe you had some bad dreams?’ 
! ere is a conversation between the car-
diologist and the bioanalyst—they stand 
around the machine placed on a low 
table near the patient. (…) On the screen 
of the machine they can ‘see’ the device 
history. ‘Can we do anything to measure 
these?’ asks the cardiologist. After many 
examinations and discussions (…) they 
summarize: ‘Well, we can say that the 
machine works as it’s supposed to; how-
ever, the question remains: should we 
do anything?’ (…) (Observation notes, 
May 2009)
! e conversation is based on joint e# orts 
to make sense of the numbers. It illustrates 
how boundaries are questioned in such 
a way that both data and the experiences 
of the patient are being problematized. A 
shock does not exclude the experience of 
a nightmare. In addition, bad dreams are 
playing a role in how the bioanalyst make 
sense of the data from the device. ! e 
healthcare practitioners use the information 
provided by the patient’s experience and 
mental state to test the data. ! e bioanalyst 
also explained that even if the device data 
looked ‘good’ and did not give rise to any 
concerns from the point of the device, if the 
patient had concerns based on experience, 
they would re-examine the patient and the 
data and perhaps make an intervention. 
! e process of data interpretation 
during telemonitoring is similar. When the 
bioanalysts and cardiologists in the clinic 
are browsing through the information they 
receive on their screens, they are faced 
with problems of ambiguity in investigating 
curves and graphs in order to examine the 
values of the data: Are they stable or not? 
Are they correct? Sorting out which data 
deserve to be discussed with the ‘additional 
source of information’, namely the patient 
present in ‘$ esh and blood,’ is a crucial 
node when enacting the boundaries of the 
object created and the recon" guration of 
the further treatment of the patient. ! is is 
in contrast to the situation with the woman 
patient on the manufacturers’ website, 
where the physician easily distinguishes 
between a dream and a shock initiated 
by the device and provides a ready-made 
answer to her question. 
Making a body legible involves 
uncertainties. In cases where the patient 
seems to feel good but the data are critical, 
they would not hesitate to de" ne the object 
of knowledge di# erently and make an 
intervention. Adding a# ective material-
semiotic actors, such as the patient’s 
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sensations and experiences and the 
sensibility of the practitioners, improves the 
protocol and the quality of the decisions. 
! e episode demonstrates the qualities 
that Rosi Braidotti’s version of the cyborg 
emphasizes: A# ectivity, connection-
making, interrelationality, receptivity, and 
an enlarged sense of community that does 
not have the human at the centre. Obviously 
the patients need the medical practitioners’ 
input in the treatment they are subjected 
to. But the episode reveals that information 
about the patients’ experiences are crucial 
in the medical practitioners’ reading of 
computer data. Even if the patients may 
believe that the computer-based data are 
more objective and hesitate to bring in 
their own sensations and experiences, the 
practitioners try to convince the patients 
that they need their personal a# ective 
input and evidence in order to make sense 
of the data in the best way. ! is tension 
between computerized standardized data 
and experience – the patients as well as 
the practitioners’ ability to make sense of 
sources of information – is precisely what 
Leigh Star captures in describing the cyborg 
as something between, yet in relationship to, 
standardized technologies /infrastructures 
and local experience (Star, 1991: 39). 
Science and technology has critically 
been described as ‘a culture of no culture’ 
(Traweek, 1992), as if it were governed by 
rationality beyond social constraints yet 
worked as an empowering force, an image 
in line with Clynes and Kline’s (1960) ideas 
as well as the manufacturers’ imaginaries. 
We suggest cyborg heart as an analytical 
device that describes an a# ective apparatus 
of bodily production and captures how 
‘mind, body and technologies are on very 
intimate terms’ speci" cally in surviving 
as ICD patients (Haraway, 1991: 165). 
Patients are not addressed as rational actors 
accountable for their intentional behaviour, 
and science and the medical practitioners 
are not the only source of authority. Patients 
are encouraged to recall bodily a# ects, 
such as nightmares and dreams, in order to 
localize things in the past that the data show 
might have triggered jolts of electricity, 
things that might have left other material-
semiotic traces, such as dreams. Activities 
occurring while the patient is asleep are 
not considered irrelevant because they 
are beyond the subject’s rational reach. 
An enlarged sense of community does not 
refer to the inclusion of patients as rational 
subjects as the modern idea of ‘Patient 2.0’ 
could suggest, just as the infrastructure does 
not work as a neutral substrate on which 
human interactions and interpretations 
take place. As an analytical device cyborg 
heart exempli" es an enlarged sense of 
community, based on a# ectivity, endurance 
and connection-making, an image in 
contrast to the idyllic nuclear family we 
found in the manufacturers’ imaginary and 
to the idea of the empowered Patient 2.0. 
Cyborg heart urges us to pay attention to 
the material and semiotic interconnections 
and interdependencies we are involved in, 
as patients as well as in any other capacity. 
Cyborg Heart
Donna Haraway’s Manifesto co-opted 
the cyborg " gure and took it from the 
utopian space in cybernetics and dystopian 
universes in science " ction to the everyday 
lives of organisms and people on a global 
scale: Cyborgs for earthly survival. ! e 
idea of recon" gurations of materialities, 
textualities and subjectivities replaced the 
technological determinism situated within 
the idea of a progressive development of a 
rational world, or it’s opposite a dystopian 
nightmare. As an analytic device cyborg 
heart uncovers modern ideas of subjectivity 
and technology in the images of science 
and medicine represented on the websites 
of ICD manufacturers, and in the idea of 
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‘Patient 2.0’ ! ese modern imaginaries 
bear a resemblance to what Annemarie 
Mol has termed the ‘patient as customer’ 
(Mol, 2008: 14). According to Mol this ideal 
is based on a logic of choice, and celebrates 
the notion that making the right choices is 
the core activity of chronically ill patients. 
In our case the patient is portrayed as being 
served by healthcare professionals who are 
remotely monitoring them, which indicates 
that selecting the right device on the market, 
and relying on the professionals involved 
in monitoring it, will enable you to live a 
‘normal’ life as if you did not su# er from 
a condition. ! e concept ‘logic of choice’ 
underlines that this imaginary not only 
belongs to banal advertisements, but has 
important political e# ects in promoting a 
market approach to healthcare. 
! e manufacturers’ imaginary provides 
freedom for the patient by hiding her 
or his dependency, at the same time as 
technologies extend the power of the 
doctor and the manufacturing company. 
! e home monitoring device is designed 
to reduce connections, so, for example, 
the information from the patient’s heart is 
automatically transmitted to the physician. 
! e inscribed user identity envisions a 
person, who is not involved in her or his 
treatment, but leaves it to the professionals 
to make sense of the data and manage her 
or his condition (Akrich & Latour, 1992: 
259). In contrast we discovered in the clinic 
that the object created during monitoring of 
the illness is not simply data as provided by 
the technology device. Instead, the object 
of concern during medical monitoring 
practices includes the patient in mind and 
body, a cyborg heart, with all its complexities. 
! e ‘Patient 2.0’ idea di# ers from the 
manufacturers’ imaginary primarily by 
turning the perspective on technologies and 
expertise ‘upside down’. ! e idea embodies 
the ideal of an empowered patient, and 
emphasizes that patients should be involved 
in their own treatment in an active and 
rational manner, seeking information about 
their disease, and engaging themselves 
actively in monitoring their condition at 
home. ! e technology is seen as enabling 
the patient to be less dependent on science 
and medical authorities. Technological 
development guarantees progress 
particularly on behalf of the patient: 
Yesterday we had infrastructure 1.0, today 
2.0, and in the future maybe an even more 
advanced 3.0. 
Cyborg heart con" gures patients, sciences 
as well as medical practitioners, companies 
and technologies very di# erently. It relates 
to Annemarie Mol idea of a ‘logic of care’, 
an interactive, open-ended process that is 
attuned to the di%  culties of living with a 
chronic condition and which o# ers support 
to patients (Mol, 2008: 25). It shares with 
Mol the idea that identity is multiple as well 
as corporeal; neither patients nor scientists 
are idealised; nor are they seen as stable 
and unambiguous categories that interact 
with each other. It underlines the relations 
and interdependences among human as 
well as nonhuman entities in constituting 
an a# ective apparatus of bodily production. 
! e empirical insights from our cyborg 
analysis of the work in the clinic highlights 
the entanglement of elements in making 
medical decisions such as re-programming 
the device, performing a new surgery, or 
changing the medication. ! e data derive 
from many sources, numbers on the screen, 
as well as the patients’ sense-making of 
bodily and emotional sensations. As we 
saw in the example, ‘bad numbers’ in 
combination with ‘good interpretations’ 
meant that the medical personnel decided 
not to intervene. Conversely, if the numbers 
are ‘good,’ but the patient feels ‘bad,’ they 
will probably intervene. ! is extraordinary 
collaboration is captured in the idea of the 
cyborg heart based upon a# ectivity rather 
than rationality, an enlarged sense of 
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community that does not have the human 
at the centre. We prefer cyborg heart to 
a logic of care, as the genealogy of care 
underlines the idea of a liberal de" nition of 
the individual and of a human intentional 
subject. 
We can – still – learn from the way the 
androids in Blade Runner question what is 
human and what is machine. We argue that 
ICD patients with their cyborg hearts are 
best understood as an extended community 
with ethical implications, as in the slogan: 
Cyborgs for earthly survival: survival on 
earth, and survival of the earth. 
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